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Abstract
We report the first, to the best of our knowledge, hand-in-hand collaboration
between human rights activists and machine learners, leveraging crowd-sourcing
to study online abuse against women on Twitter. On a technical front, we carefully
curate an unbiased yet low-variance dataset of labeled tweets, analyze it to account
for the variability of abuse perception, and establish baselines, preparing it for
release to community research efforts. On a social impact front, this study provides
the technical backbone for a media campaign aimed at raising public and deciders’
awareness and elevating the standards expected from social media companies.
1 Introduction
Social media platforms have become a critical space for women and marginalized groups to express
themselves at an unprecedented scale. Yet a stream of research by Amnesty International [1, 2]
showed that many women are subject to targeted online violence and abuse, which denies them the
right to use social media platforms equally, freely, and without fear. Being confronted with toxicity at
a massive scale leaves a long-lasting effect on mental health, sometimes even resulting in withdrawal
from public life altogether [3]. A first smaller-scale analysis of online abuse against women UK
Members of Parliament (MPs) on Twitter [4, 5] proved the impact such targeted campaigns can have:
it contributed to British Prime Minister Theresa May publicly calling out the impact of online abuse
on democracy [6].
This laid the groundwork for the larger-scale Troll Patrol project that we present here: a joint effort
by human rights researchers and technical experts to analyze millions of tweets through the help
of online volunteers. Our main research result is the development of a dataset that could help in
developing tools to aid online moderators. To that end, we i) Designed a large, enriched, yet unbiased
dataset of hundreds of thousands of tweets; ii) Crowd-sourced its labeling to online volunteers; iii)
Analyzed its quality via a thorough agreement analysis, to account for the personal variability of
abuse perception; iv) Compared multiple baselines with the aim of classifying a larger dataset of
millions of tweets. Beyond this collaboration, this should allow researchers worldwide to push the
envelope on this very challenging task – one of many in natural language understanding [7].
The social impact Amnesty International is aiming for is ultimately to influence social media compa-
nies like Twitter into increasing investment and resources – under any form – dedicated to tackling
online abuse against women. With this study, we contribute to this social impact by providing the
research backbone for a planned media campaign in November 2018.
2 Crowd-sourcing an importance-sampled enriched set
Core to this study is the careful crafting of a large set of tweets followed by a massive crowd-sourced
data labeling effort.
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Figure 1: Left to right: Distribution of annotations-per-tweet: To analyze agreement, we used only tweets
annotated more than twice (∼73k); Values of Contain Abuse are ordinal; Type and Medium conditioned on
Contain Abuse 6= No: the majority of abuse is not easily classified, and the vast majority of abuse is textual.
Studied population: We selected 778 women politicians and journalists with an active, non-protected
Twitter account, with fewer than 1 million followers, including most women British MPs and all
US Congresswomen, and journalists from a range of news organizations representing a diversity of
media bias. Full details are in Appendix A.
Tweet collection: 14.5M tweets mentioned at least one woman of interest during 2017. We obtained
a subset of 10K per day sampled uniformly from Twitter’s Firehose, minus tweets deleted since
publication, totaling 2.2M tweets.
Pre-labeling selection: Taking into account the average labeling time per tweet from a pilot study,
the expected duration of the campaign, and the expected graders’ engagement, we targeted labeling
at most 275K tweets in triplicate. We first selected 215K tweets, correcting the 10K daily cap using
per-day stratified sampling proportional to each day’s actual volume. While this sample is statistically
representative of the actual tweet distributions, its class imbalance would induce high variance into
any estimator, and waste the graders’ engagement. We therefore enriched the dataset with 60K tweets
pre-filtered through the Naive-Bayes classifier pre-trained in [5]. To maintain statistical non-bias, we
keep track of the importance sampling weights.
Volunteers labeling via crowd-sourcing: Finally, these tweets, properly randomized, were deployed
through Amnesty Decoders, the micro-tasking platform based on Hive [8] and Discourse [9] where
Amnesty International engages digital volunteers (mostly existing members and supporters) in
human rights research. Great effort was put into designing a user-friendly, interactive interface,
accessible at [10] – see Appendix D for screenshots. After a video tutorial, volunteers were shown
an anonymized tweet from the randomized sample, then were asked multiple-choice questions: 1)
“Does the tweet contain problematic or abusive content?” (No, Problematic, Abusive). Unless their
answer was No, the follow-up questions were “What type of problematic or abusive content does it
contain?” (at least one of six) and (optional question) “What is the medium of abuse?” (one of four).
See Fig. 1 for details and summary statistics. At all times they had access to definitions and examples
of abusive and problematic content, and the typologies thereof – see Appendix E.
By August 2018, 157K unique tweets containing 167K mentions of the studied individuals had been
categorized at least once, totalling 337K labels, thanks to the contribution of 4, 537 online volunteers.
Experts labeling: In addition to engaging digital volunteers, Amnesty also asked three experts
(Amnesty’s researcher on online abuse against women, Amnesty’s manager of the Troll Patrol project
and an external expert in online abuse) to label a sub-set of 568 tweets. Those tweets were sampled
from tweets labeled by exactly three volunteers as of June 8, 2018. To ensure low variance in the
estimates, we once again used importance sampling, inflating the proportion of potentially abusive
tweets by sampling 500 tweets uniformly from those labeled as “Abusive” by the Naive-Bayes
classifier mentioned in [5] and “Basic Negative” by Crimson Hexagon’s sentiment analysis (our
Firehose access provider), and 500 tweets uniformly sampled on the remainder.
Re-weighting after importance sampling: To ensure that any inference or training based on the
enriched sample is representative of the Twitter distribution, we use importance sampling to re-weight
the tweets in the empirical distribution. The weights are defined as the ratio of the target distribution
(as estimated by the daily counts) and the enriched distribution – see Appendix C for the full derivation
of the weights.
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3 Analysis and generalization
3.1 Agreement analysis
We quantified the agreement among raters – within crowd and within experts – using Fleiss’ kappa (κ),
a statistical measure of inter-rater agreement [11]. κ is designed for nominal (non-ordinal categorical)
variables, e.g. Fig 1(c), whereas in ordinal variables κ tends to underestimate the agreement because
it treats the disagreement between Problematic <> Abusive the same as No <> Abusive. We also use
the intra-class correlation (ICC) [12] for ordinal categorical annotations, like Contains Abuse: No
< Problematic < Abusive. We define κ and icc below, and further explain in Appendix B.
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Figure 2: Visualizing the distribution of annotations a(t) (+ jitter for clarity) in the multinomial 2-simplex.
The corners are events of complete agreement. The center is no agreement with the non-ordinal assumption, but
partial agreement with ordinality. Left to right: Simulated perfect agreement, a(t)c = 3, c ∼ Pˆ (C); Agreement
among 3 experts on 1000 tweets: empirical probabilities are visually amplified by over-sampling a(t) to 20k;
Agreement among N = 3 Decoders per tweet: if N > 3, raters are chosen randomly; Simulated agreement-by-
chance only: a(t) ∼ Multinomial(N = 3, p = Pˆ (C)). The multinomial assumes independence between trials.
A hierarchical modeling approach can capture inter-rater dependence [13, 14].
Fleiss’ kappa:A rater can annotate a tweet as class c ∈ C = {No,Problematic,Abusive}. The
annotation a = (aNo, aPr, aAb), ac ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},Σcac = N , contains the class counts for a tweet
annotated by N raters. The overall agreement for a set of tweets T is κ = 1|T |Σtκ
(t), where
κ(t) =
Σcr
(t)
c −Σcp2c
1−Σcp2c is the within-tweet agreement, and rc =
ac(ac−1)
N(N−1) ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of
pairs of raters that agree on c. Pˆ (C = c) = pc is the empirical probability of c, hence Σcp2c is the
probability of agreement-by-chance.
ICC (intra-class correlation): Let A ∈ R|T |×N be the matrix of annotations, Ai,j ∈ {0, 1, 2}
(ordinal values raters can assign), and each row is a tweet annotated by N random raters. The
tweet-specific mean is µi = 1N ΣjAi,j and the overall mean is µ =
1
|T |Σiµi. The within-tweet
disagreement for tweet i is V (i) = 1(N−1)Σj (Ai,j − µi)2, and its average Vw = 1|T |ΣiV (i) is the
overall within-tweet variance. Similarly, the between-tweet variance is Vb = N|T |−1Σi(µi − µ)2. The
icc can now be expressed in terms of a one-way ANOVA [12]: icc = Vb−VwVb+(N−1)Vw , the fraction of
variation in annotations that is not explained by between-tweet disagreements.
Results: Table 1 and Figure 2 (mid left / mid right) show more agreement among the experts than
among the volunteers – higher κ and ICC among the former. There is also more agreement when
assessing the presence of abuse than when assessing the type of abuse.
0.0 0.5 1.0
FPR
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
TP
R
0.0 0.5 1.0
precision
(0.29, 0.52)
(0.45, 0.41)
weighted ROC / Precision-Recall  (Perspective)
vs Experts (auc=0.78, F1-opt=0.38)
vs Crowd (auc=0.89, F1-opt=0.43)
F1-optimal
0.0 0.5 1.0
FPR
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
TP
R
0.5 1.0
precision
(0.50, 0.44)
(0.35, 0.57)
weighted ROC / Precision-Recall  (fine-tuned BERT)
vs Experts (auc=0.89, F1-opt=0.47)
vs Crowd (auc=0.91, F1-opt=0.43)
F1-optimal
0.0 0.5 1.0
FPR
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
TP
R
0.5 1.0
precision
(0.41, 0.53)
weighted ROC / Precision-Recall  (Crowd)
vs Experts (auc=0.90, F1-opt=0.46)
F1-optimal
Figure 3: Left & center: performance of Perspective API and fine-tuned BERT classifiers, with respect to the
experts’ and crowd’s labels. Right: performance of the crowd-as-a-classifier against the experts’ labels. Note:
Recall is equivalent to TPR, hence the y-axes (TPR<>Recall) of the two plots are aligned.
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Table 1: Agreement per variable and
per labeling cohort.
Labels from Crowd Experts
κ ICC κ ICC
Contain Abuse .26 .35 .54 .70
Type of Abuse .16 - .74 -
Table 2: Classifier performance vs. crowd vs. expert labels
Labels from Crowd Experts
Precision Recall F ∗1 AP Precision Recall F
∗
1 AP
Naive Bayes .13 .25 .17 .11 .40 .27 .32 .21
Crimson Hexagon .14 .40 .20 - .05 .04 .04 -
Davidson et al. .53 .27 .36 .25 .35 .46 .39 .25
Perspective API .45 .41 .43 .34 .29 .52 .38 .25
Fine-tuned BERT .35 .57 .43 .40 .50 .44 .47 .36
Crowd - - - - .41 .53 .46 .39
3.2 Comparison of baseline classifiers
The core focus in this study is to build and analyze the dataset, with a view to extend that analysis to
the remaining 2M unlabeled tweets using state of the art models. We prepare this follow-up research
community effort by establishing baselines on various classification models.
Classifiers: In Table 2, Naive Bayes refers to the classifier from [5]. Crimson Hexagon refers to
sentiment labels – Category and Emotion – from Crimson Hexagon. We also benchmarked the
pre-trained classifier from Davidson et al. [15]. Perspective API refers to the public toxicity scoring
API provided by Jigsaw [16, 17]. We also trained our own model, which combined a pre-trained
BERT embedder [18] and an abuse-specific embedding trained from scratch. For details see F.
Methodology: For this analysis, we conflate the labels Problematic and Abusive into one positive
(Abusive) class. The crowd labels are the majority votes over labels on tweets labeled by exactly
three volunteers. The expert labels are majority votes over labels from the three domain experts
mentioned in Section 2. For Crimson Hexagon, we define Abusive as the intersection of Category
= Basic Negative and Emotion = Anger | Disgust.
Results: Table 2 shows the F ∗1 (optimal F1 score), corresponding precision and recall, and the
Average Precision (AP ), to evaluate several abuse detection classifiers with respect to labels from the
crowd and from the experts.
4 Discussion
Dataset availability and reproducibility: Amnesty International intends to publish as much of the
dataset as possible to encourage replication and further research on the topic. At the very least the
URLs of the tweets and the grades will be made public. Publishing the actual tweets is more delicate
due to Twitter Terms and Conditions. Publishing the meta-data on the graders (gender, location)
would be of great interest, but is still under discussion from an ethical point of view.
Future work: We aim to eventually apply different classifiers to the whole unlabeled dataset, so as
to scale up the human rights researchers’ work by sifting through the huge amount of tweets. As
shown in Section 3.2, this will require a careful tuning of models to increase the precision beyond its
current performance. In parallel, we also want to analyze the scale, typology and intersectionality of
abuse, either on the labeled set or on the classified extra 2M tweets, for the planned media campaign.
Social impact: The sheer volume of hateful speech on social media has recently prompted govern-
ments to put strong pressure on social media companies to remove such speech [19]. The moderation
of abusive messages at scale requires some form of automated assistance. Our results highlight the
double challenge of automatic abuse classification: the subjectivity in the labels and the limited ability
of state-of-the-art classifiers to generalize beyond training data. This all points toward the need for
systems where human subtlety and context awareness are empowered by automatic pre-screening.
Whether the companies themselves should be trusted with (or required to implement) such moderation,
or whether they should fund or be supervised by a third-party neutral watchdog, goes far beyond a
purely technical conversation. This is why collaboration between technical experts (machine learners,
data scientists) and domain experts (human rights researchers, anti-censorship activist, etc.), as well
as society in a broader sense, is so important for genuinely impactful AI for Social Good efforts.
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A Population definition
We selected politicians and journalists with an active, non protected Twitter account, with fewer than
1 million followers. The group included:
• All women members of the British Parliament (220, including 22 women who left parliament
during the June 2017 elections and excluding one politician with over 1 million followers);
• All women in the United States Congress (107, excluding 3 politicians with more than 1
million followers);
• And women journalists working at the following news organizations, selected to represent a
diversity of media bias:
– Breitbart (16),
– Daily Mail (78),
– The Sun (54),
– The Guardian (124),
– The New York Times (278),
– Gal-Dem (23),
– PinkNews (9).
B Agreement analysis
B.1 Fleiss’ Kappa
Notation A rater can annotate a tweet as class c ∈ C = {No, Problematic, Abusive}. The
annotation tuple a = (aNo, aPr, aAb), ac ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }, Σcac = N , contains the class-specific
counts for a tweet annotated by N raters.
Estimation of κ The within-class agreement-ratio rc = ac (ac−1)N (N−1) ∈ [0, 1] is the ratio of pairs of
raters that agree on c, over the total of pairs of N raters. Pˆ (C = c) = pc is the empirical marginal
probability of class c. Hence, Σc p
2
c is the overall probability of agreement by chance across a dataset
of tweets. For a specific tweet t we can compute the within-class agreement κ(t)c =
r(t)c −p2c
1 − Σcp2c , where
the numerator is the agreement-above-chance attained on c, and the denominator is the best-case-
scenario (maximal) agreement-above-chance attainable across classes. Hence κ(t)c is the fraction that
the attained agreement in c contributes to the best-case scenario, while accounting for agreement-by-
chance. Finally, the within-tweet agreement for a tweet t is the sum across classes, κ(t) = Σcκ
(t)
c ,
and the overall agreement across a set of tweets T is the expectation
κ = ET [κ(.)] ≈ 1|T |Σtκ(t). (1)
B.2 ICC (intra-class correlation)
Notation We denote the matrix of annotation as A ∈ R|T | × N . In this work, Ai, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}
(ordinal values raters can assign), where each row represents a tweet annotated by N random raters.
Algorithm The tweet-specific mean is µi = 1N ΣjAi,j and the overall mean is µ =
1
|T |Σiµi. We
can express the within-tweet disagreement as the within-tweet variance V (i) = 1(N−1)Σj (Ai,j−µi)2.
Then the average of within-tweet disagreements expresses the overall within-tweet variance, Vw =
1
|T |ΣiV
(i). Similarly, the between-tweet variance is Vb = N|T |−1Σi(µi−µ)2. Note that the i-th tweet
is polarized when V (i) is maximized, i.e. half of the raters choose 0 and the other half choose 2. In
the extreme scenario that all tweets are maximally polarizing, Vb = 0. Therefore Vb expresses the
overall tendency for disagreement-by-chance. All classes of ICC are equivalent to a type of ANOVA
(ANalysis Of VAriance) in linear mixed-effects model of annotations [12]. In our case,
icc(1, k) =
Vb − Vw
Vb + (N − 1)Vw (2)
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Intuitively, the ANOVA framework defines agreement as the fraction of variation in annotations that
is not explained by between-tweet disagreements.
Systemic disagreement As mentioned above, in extreme scenarios where Vb is small, the ICC can
be negative. Negative κ and icc values might seem like an artifact of degenerate or extreme data, only
to be dismissed as no agreement in the downstream analysis. At closer inspection, the numerator
shows that subtracting the agreement-by-chance yields a measure of systemic disagreement: e.g.
expecting P (agreement-by-chance) = 0.9 but observing agreement only 20% of the time, implies a
systemic cause for polarizing opinions (e.g. controversial content, raters annotating with different
rules).
C Importance sampling analysis
Population and Crimson sets W and C: We denote the population (World set) as W , and the
sample obtained from the Twitter firehose (Crimson set) as C. Members of the sets W and C are
observation tuples (t, k, d), where t is the text content of a tweet, k ∈ {0, 1} is the output of a Naive
Bayes Classifier NBC : t 7→ k, and d is the day in 2017 that a tweet was published:
C ⊂W = {(t, k, d)} (3)
Distributions pW and pC: We define pW and pC as the probability mass over sets W and C,
respectively, and any marginals and conditionals thereof:
pW (t, k, d) = pW (t, k|d) pW (d) (4)
pC(t, k, d) = pC(t, k|d) pC(d) (5)
The density pW (d) is directly available from the daily total volumes nd of tweets matching the query,
total that is provided by Crimson Hexagon alongside the smaller sampled set C:
nd = |{(t, k, d′) ∈W : d′ = d}| provided as metadata,
pW (d) =
nd∑
d′ nd′
. (6)
The Crimson set C is constructed by uniform sampling over tweets in W , such that for any day d, the
conditional probabilities over both sets are equal:
pC(t, k|d) = pW (t, k|d) (7)
Then, using eq. (7) in (5):
pC(t, k, d) = pW (t, k|d) pC(d) (8)
Constructed set A: The final set A is defined as the union
A = B ∪ F, (9)
where
B = {(t, k, d) ∼ pB(t, k, d) ' pW (t, k|d) pˆW (d) ' pW (t, k, d)} (10)
approximates the world joint distribution through stratified sampling per day, and
F = {(t, k, d) ∈ C\B : k = 1} (11)
is an enriched sample resulting from pre-filtering by a simple Naive Bayes classifier. The cardinalities
of these sets are: |C| = 2.2M , |B| = 215k, |F | = 60k and |A| = 275k.
With β = |F ||B|+|F | , and z(d) a normalizing constant depending on d:
pA(t, k|d) = βI(k = 1) pA(t, k|d) + (1− β) pA(t, k|d)
z(d)
(12)
where I(.) is the indicator function.
The conditional probabilities of a tweet are identical in W and A:
pW (t|k, d) = pA(t|k, d) . (13)
Combining equations (13) and (12) leads to:
pA(t, k|d) ∝ βI(k = 1) pW (t|k, d) pW (k|d) + (1− β) pW (t|k, d) pW (k|d) . (14)
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Importance weights wi: Estimating statistics on the world set W using the samples in set A can
be achieved using importance sampling, i.e. assigning a specific weight pW (t, k, d)/pA(t, k, d) to
each triplet (t, k, d) in A.
For each tweet (t, k, d) ∈ A, we define the weighting function w
w(t, k, d) =
pW (t, k, d)
pA(t, k, d)
=
pW (t|k, d) pW (k, d)
pA(t|k, d) pA(k, d) . (15)
Injecting equation (13) in equation (15), we can simplify by pW (t|k, d):
w(t, k, d) =
pW (k, d)
pA(k, d)
=
pW (k|d) pW (d)
pA(k|d) pA(d) . (16)
Since A is a finite set, the probability mass functions pA(k|d) and pA(d) in equation (16) are directly
accessible by simple counting.
The probability mass functions pW (d) is known from (6). The term pW (k|d) is not available in closed
form, but can be estimated straightforwardly. Indeed from equation (7) we have pW (k|d) = pC(k|d),
and the latter can be estimated by simple counting on C, leading to empirical estimate:
pˆW (k|d) = |{(t, k
′, d′) ∈ C : k′ = k, d′ = d}|
|{(t, k′, d′) ∈ C : k′ = k}| . (17)
This leads to the final plug-in estimator of the importance weights:
wˆ(t, k, d) =
pˆW (k|d)pW (d)
pA(k|d)pA(d) . (18)
For any given function f(t, k, d), we therefore estimate its expectation in the whole population W
using the self-normalized importance estimator:
EˆW [f(t, k, d)] =
∑
(ti,ki,di)∈A
wi∑
j wj
f(ti, ki, di) . (19)
where for any tweet (ti, ki, di) with GUID (Globally Unique Identifier) i we use the estimated
unnormalized importance weight wi := wˆ(ti, ki, di).
Note that for full mathematical rigour, the asymptotic consistency of the importance sampling
estimator EˆW could be proven by showing that the replacement of the density estimator pˆW in the
plug-in estimator wˆ is asymptotically valid. Such a proof could proceed along the lines of [20], but is
outside of the scope of this article.
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D Labeling tool screenshots
The workflow presented to each grader by the labelling tool is illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
Figure 4: First stage of labeling: Initial screen showing an anonymized tweet, with anonymized handles and
first question.
(a) Second stage of labeling:
Identification of the type of abuse.
(b) Third, optional stage of label-
ing: Identification of the part of
the tweet that carries the abuse.
(c) Warning displayed after clas-
sifying a tweet as abusive, to min-
imize the impact on the labelers’
mental health.
Figure 5: Follow-up stages, conditional on the first stage of labeling.
E Definitions and examples used in Troll Patrol - Trigger Warning
Abusive content Abusive content violates Twitter’s own rules and includes tweets that promote
violence against or threaten people based on their race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation,
gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease.
Examples include physical or sexual threats, wishes for the physical harm or death, reference to
violent events, behaviour that incites fear or repeated slurs, epithets, racist and sexist tropes, or other
content that degrades someone. For more information, see Twitter’s hateful conduct policy.
In examples shown below, tweets were anonymized and only show a standard template (incl. the
author handle, the author profile picture, the tweet date and time, likes and retweets).
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Problematic content Hurtful or hostile content, especially if it were repeated to an individual on
multiple or cumulative occasions, but not as intense as an abusive tweet. It can reinforce negative or
harmful stereotypes against a group of individuals (e.g. negative stereotypes about a race or people
who follow a certain religion). Such tweets may have the effect of silencing an individual or groups
of individuals.
Sexism or misogyny Insulting or abusive content directed at women based on their gender, includ-
ing content intended to shame, intimidate or degrade women. It can include profanity, threats, slurs
and insulting epithets.
Racism Discriminatory, offensive or insulting content directed at a woman based on her race,
including content that aims to attack, harm, belittle, humiliate or undermine her.
Homophobia or transphobia Discriminatory, offensive or insulting content directed at a woman
based on her sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression. This includes negative
comments towards bisexual, homosexual and transgender people.
Ethnic or religious slur Discriminatory, offensive or insulting content directed at a woman based
on her ethnic or religious identities.
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Physical threats Direct or indirect threats of physical violence or wishes for serious physical harm,
death, or disease.
Sexual threats Direct or indirect threats of sexual violence or wishes for rape or other forms of
sexual assault.
Other There will be some tweets that fall under the ‘other category’ that are problematic and/or
abusive. For example, statements that target a user’s disability, be it physical or mental, or content
that attacks a woman’s nationality, health status, legal status, employment, etc.
F Abuse Classification Model
Model architecture We used a pretrained BERT model [18] (12 layers, 768 units per layer) as
the basis for our classification model. We took the final-layer representation of the first token in the
sequence as a fixed-length tweet embedding (see Figure 3 of [18]). The model was implemented
in Pytorch, and made use of the BERT implementation provided at [21], which in turn utilizes a
pre-trained model provided by Google.
To account for out-of-vocabulary abusive words, we added a second single-layer word embedding
(128 units), which we trained from scratch with a limited abusive vocabulary. This vocabulary
included a list of 1300 ‘possibly abusive’ words available online [22], and the 1000 words which
occurred most disproportionately in the abusive class of the training data. To obtain a fixed-length
representation from this embedder, we took the mean across words in each tweet.
We concatenated these two representations to obtain a fixed-length tweet representation (of length
896), and passed througha fully-connected layer of 64 units before returning a decision via a binary
softmax layer.
Data We split the crowd-sourced data into train, validation, and test sets (90 : 5 : 5). We adjust all
reported performance metrics for the original importance sampling (see C).
Training We trained the model end-to-end with stochastic gradient descent (learning rate = 0.0001,
momentum=0.9) for 11 epochs, minimizing a cross-entropy loss.
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Figure 6: We combined a pre-trained BERT model with a word embedding exclusively including abusive words.
The two embeddings were concatenated and passed through a fully-connected layer before a softmax layer
returned the prediction. Numbers in orange are layer widths.
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